# Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP

#### Classic MMP cut these cards as a part of a research drill in one afternoon. Good work MMP!

#### Recognition for Lab Organizers: Lorelai, Finn, Arish, Junior, Samarjit, William, Rory, Eli

## Russia Ups

### Russia Revisionist

#### Russia is revisionist –

#### Ukraine

Serhan 22  
[Yasmeen Serhan; Staff writer at the Atlantic; Who is Vladimir Putin’s Revisionist History For?; Atlantic; https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/putin-russia-ukraine-revisionist-history/622936/; Accessed 7-11-2022; DQ]

The evolution of Putin’s historical revisionism can be seen throughout his public statements over the years. In 2005, he famously described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Two years later, Putin bemoaned the aftermath of the Soviet era and the pernicious, unipolar world—one led not by Moscow, but by Washington—that it had created. Last year, in perhaps the clearest articulation of his worldview, Putin said that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people—a single whole.” On Monday, he took that sentiment even further, declaring Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space” whose independence was a product not of self-determination (Ukrainians resoundingly voted in favor of independence from the Soviet Union in a 1991 referendum), but rather “a mistake.”Unlike his 2014 address announcing Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, which was largely framed as a moment of celebration, this was an angry speech—one ostensibly designed to make Russia’s people angry too, and to justify what was to come. “In territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile ‘anti-Russia’ is taking shape,” Putin said in another address ahead of the invasion. “For our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation.” It’s hard to know what Putin means by historical future (which is, on its face, an oxymoron), though we can take an educated guess. When Putin speaks of Russia today, he speaks of a country whose greatness is defined by its past—namely, its imperial history and its victory during World War II—which he believes must guide its present. “Putin weaponized history by giving it a function,” Orysia Lutsevych, the head of the Ukraine Forum at the London-based Chatham House think tank, told me. As far as the Russian president is concerned, “history is the fortune teller of the future.”

#### Putin’s rhetoric and historical narratives

Yasmeen Serhan, ,2-22, "Who is Vladimir Putin’s Revisionist History For?," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/putin-russia-ukraine-revisionist-history/622936/?scrlybrkr=e0c3d9ff>, TP  
To paraphrase one of Barack Obama’s [favorite phrases](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/obama-right-side-of-history/420462/), the arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice. Were Vladimir Putin to offer his own rendition of these words, it would probably go something along the lines of: The arc of history is long, but it bends backwards. This, at least, appeared to be the thrust of the Russian president’s message this week when he offered a [rambling and ahistorical](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828#sel=8:9:vX6,8:24:UFE;19:1:b6m,19:26:Xov;34:1:H38,35:35:2rw;52:72:Wl6,53:55:l2j;60:20:Xr6,60:56:Xry;68:19:WNj,68:80:22Z;69:57:Lj2,70:24:ksw) speech dismissing Ukraine’s right to exist and then days later announced Moscow’s intent to invade the country in order to “[demilitarize and denazify Ukraine](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843).” In his telling, if Ukraine had once been part of the Soviet sphere, it should be part of Russia. And just as Russia defeated the Nazi regime in Germany, it would do so again—this time in Kyiv.Putin is not the only world leader who has harkened back to an ahistorical past to justify his decisions in the present. Right-wing nationalists [around the world](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/11/history-patriotism-right-wing-politics/) have sought to portray themselves as the primary defenders of a glorious past that their enemies would seek to deny or forget. By [whitewashing uncomfortable legacies](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/30/the-kremlin-is-trying-to-whitewash-russias-stalinist-past-a67096) and seeking to cultivate a politics of [historic grievance](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/), Putin has attempted the same. But in his justification for the [invasion of Ukraine](https://www.theatlantic.com/category/russias-invasion-ukraine/), Putin’s ahistoricism has bordered on delusion. Whether the Russian people or the rest of the world share in it, for now, appears to be immaterial: If there’s one audience this revisionist history is designed for, it’s Putin himself.The evolution of Putin’s historical revisionism can be seen throughout his public statements over the years. In 2005, he famously [described](https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057) the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Two years later, Putin [bemoaned](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034) the aftermath of the Soviet era and the pernicious, unipolar world—one led not by Moscow, but by Washington—that it had created. Last year, in perhaps the clearest articulation of his worldview, Putin said that Ukrainians and Russians are “[one people—a single whole](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843).” On Monday, he took that sentiment even further, declaring Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space” whose independence was a product not of self-determination (Ukrainians resoundingly voted in favor of independence from the Soviet Union in a [1991 referendum](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/25-years-independence-the-ukrainian-referendum)), but rather “a mistake.”Unlike his [2014 address](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l10BsQzOGKM) announcing Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, which was largely framed as a moment of celebration, this was an angry speech—one ostensibly designed to make Russia’s people angry too, and to justify what was to come. “In territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile ‘anti-Russia’ is taking shape,” Putin said in another address ahead of the invasion. “For our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation.”It’s hard to know what Putin means by historical future (which is, on its face, an oxymoron), though we can take an educated guess. When Putin speaks of Russia today, he speaks of a country whose greatness is defined by its past—namely, its imperial history and its victory during World War II—which he believes must guide its present. “Putin weaponized history by giving it a function,” Orysia Lutsevych, the head of the Ukraine Forum at the London-based Chatham House think tank, told me. As far as the Russian president is concerned, “history is the fortune teller of the future.” Such historical narratives can be compelling, especially when they elicit the kind of nostalgic nationalism that has proved potent elsewhere, including in the United States (where Donald Trump’s Republican Party has dubbed itself the defender of [“patriotic education”](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/politics/trump-patriotic-education.html)), India (where Hindu nationalists have [appealed to](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/08/modi-erdogan-religious-nationalism/615052/) pride in India’s past to undermine its secular present), and Hungary (where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán often [invokes](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/03/how-viktor-orban-turned-century-hungarian-history-into-secret-weapon/) the territories the country lost after the First World War). “Putin is not the only person who is old enough to have felt that sense of deep, personalized humiliation and shame that came with the loss of power of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War,” Keir Giles, the author of [​​Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West](https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780815735748), told me. “Anything that reasserts Russia as that great power with a greater status than others and the right to a global presence and global influence in others’ affairs will be popular in those sectors of the Russian population.”Still, it’s difficult to gauge just how big that sector is or how pervasive the narrative has been among those who don’t share Putin’s semi-mythological view of history. A recent [CNN poll](https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2022/02/europe/russia-ukraine-crisis-poll-intl/), published the day before the start of Moscow’s military invasion of Ukraine, found that though roughly half of Russians support using military force to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, only 36 percent support doing so as a means of forcing a reunification of the two countries. The lack of support for the latter was most clearly evidenced by [anti-war protests](https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2022/02/photos-anti-war-protests-russia/622914/) that have broken out across Russian cities.When I spoke with Denis Volkov, the director of the Moscow-based Levada Center, Russia’s last independent pollster, in early February, he told me that though the majority of Russians fear war, few would feel comfortable voicing opposition to it if it came due to fear of reprisals. Indeed, more than [1,700 arrests](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/we-dont-want-this-russians-react-to-the-ukraine-invasion?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Othe) have already been made. Besides, Volkov said, “public opinion will be no limit to the Russian government.”Though Putin may feel obliged to justify his war of choice to the Russian people, who with Ukrainians will share the costs of a bloody and drawn-out conflict, his revisionist history is designed to appeal to no one more so than himself. By restoring Russia’s control over its former territories, Putin not only corrects what he sees as a historic wrong but also cements his place in Russian history as the leader who restored the country to its rightful status.The irony is that in his quest to make Russia great again, he risks achieving just the opposite. Invading Ukraine has already resulted in [wide-ranging sanctions](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/sanctions-against-russia-at-a-glance-people-organisations-uk-us-eu) and has all but ensured Russia’s diplomatic isolation. Even Putin’s friends in Europe, such as [Orbán](https://twitter.com/zoltanspox/status/1497099482965721103?s=20&t=imIB8HpI9TF87fiiLNyf0g) and Czech President [Milos Zeman](https://www.reuters.com/business/czech-president-russia-should-be-cut-off-swift-2022-02-24/), have gone out of their way to reiterate their support for Ukraine and their commitment to a joint European Union stance.“Putin’s views have become more and more extreme over time to the point where they are now more or less unrecognizable and have few points of contact with history as it’s understood in the outside world,” Giles said. “He’s operating in a different plane of reality and in a different century.”

### Russia Not Revisionist

#### Russia’s not revisionist –

#### peace talks prove

**Lieven** **22** (Anatol Lieven; Anatol Lieven is a British author, journalist, and policy analyst best known for his expertise on the Taliban of Afghanistan. He is currently a visiting professor at King's College London and senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; 3-4-22; “It’s time to ask: what would a Ukraine-Russia peace deal look like?”; Guardian News and Media Limited; https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/blogs-podcasts-websites/s-time-ask-what-would-ukraine-russia-peace-deal/docview/2635741560/se-2?accountid=14667)//SD

There is still the possibility of a diplomatic settlement that would bring an early end to this dreadful war and Russian military withdrawal while safeguarding the vital interests of Ukraine. Indeed, if the Russians are ever to withdraw, a diplomatic agreement on the terms of withdrawal will be necessary. The first round of Ukrainian-Russian talks has now taken place in Belarus, and a member of the Ukrainian delegation has stated that “The parties identified a number of priority topics in which certain solutions were outlined”. The West should back a peace agreement and Russian withdrawal by offering Russia the lifting of all new sanctions imposed on it. The offer to Ukraine should be a massive reconstruction package that will also help Ukraine to move towards the West economically and politically rather than militarily – just as Finland and Austria were able to do during the Cold War despite their neutral status. The demands by the Russian side are that Ukraine should sign a treaty of neutrality; engage in “demilitarisation” and “denazification”; and recognise Russian sovereignty over Crimea, which was seized back by Russia after the Ukrainian Revolution. These demands are a mixed bag of the acceptable, the unacceptable, and the undefined. The option of neutrality for Ukraine has often been called “Finlandisation”, and perhaps the determined and unified Ukrainian response to Russian aggression over the past week has given a new meaning to that term in the case of Ukraine. For like the Finns in the “winter war” of 1939-40, the Ukrainians have also been abandoned militarily by the West, which has declared publicly and repeatedly that it has no intention of fighting to defend them. On the other hand, it seems that the extraordinary courage and resolution with which the Finns fought convinced Stalin that to rule Finland would be too much of a challenge. Finland became the only part of the former Russian Empire not to be incorporated in the USSR, and during the cold war, though neutral by treaty, was able to develop as a successful social market democracy. Similarly, we must hope that the courage and determination of the Ukrainians has convinced Putin that it will be impossible to run Ukraine as a Russian client state, and neutrality is the best deal he is going to get. President Volodymyr Zelensky has publicly hinted that a treaty of neutrality may be on offer; and he is right to do so. For two things have been made absolutely clear by this war: that Russia will fight to prevent Ukraine becoming a military ally of the West, and the West will not fight to defend to defend Ukraine. In view of this, to keep open the possibility of an offer of Nato membership that Nato has no intention of ever honouring, and asking Ukrainians to die for this fiction, is worse than hypocritical. As to “demilitarisation” and “denazification”, the meaning and terms of these will have to be negotiated. Demilitarisation is obviously unacceptable if it means that Ukraine must unilaterally dissolve its armed forces; but the latest statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has suggested that Russia would accept a ban on missiles based in Ukraine. This could be modelled on a similar guarantee to the US that ended the Cuba Missile Crisis. As for “Denazification”, this presumably means that Ukraine should ban extreme right wing nationalist parties and militias at Russia’s behest. This is a completely unacceptable interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs; but perhaps Ukraine could make a counter-offer that would meet Moscow’s concerns about the rights and future of the Russian minority in Ukraine by guaranteeing these under the Ukrainian constitution – which, by the way, is something that the West should support anyway, in accordance with its own principles. There remains the demand for recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea. Here, respect for international law (slightly ambiguous in the case of Crimea, which was only transferred from Russia to Ukraine by Soviet decree in 1954) must be tempered by considerations of reality, the prevention of future conflict, and the interests of ordinary people in the region – which is essentially what we have been asking Russia to do in the case of Kosovo. Ukraine has already lost Crimea, and cannot recover it, as Serbia cannot recover Kosovo, without a bloody and unending war that in this case Ukraine would almost certainly lose. Our principle in all such disputes must be that the fate of the territories concerned must be decided by local democratic referenda under international supervision. This should also apply to the Donbas separatist republics. These proposals will be denounced as “rewarding Russian aggression”; but if Putin’s original aim really was to subjugate the whole of Ukraine, then by such an agreement Moscow would fall far short of its maximal goals. Moreover, such an agreement would give Russia nothing that it had not in practice already achieved before launching the invasion. The West is morally right to oppose the monstrous and illegal Russian war and to have imposed exceptionally severe sanctions on Russia in response, but would be morally wrong to oppose a reasonable agreement to end the invasion and spare the people of Ukraine terrible suffering. America’s own record over the past generation gives no basis for such self-righteous hyper-legalism.

#### **no means nor will**

Chotiner 22  
[Isaac Chotiner ;Staff Writer at NYT ; 3-1-2022; Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine; New Yorker; https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine; Accessed 7-23-2022; DQ]

No, none of us know what’s going to happen. You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv? No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. I thought you said that he was not interested in taking Kyiv. No, he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.? As opposed to what? As opposed to permanently conquering Kyiv. It would be a Russian-friendly government that he would presumably have some say over, right? Yes, exactly. But it’s important to understand that it is fundamentally different from conquering and holding onto Kyiv. Do you understand what I’m saying? We could all think of imperial possessions whereby a sort of figurehead was put on the throne, even if the homeland was actually controlling what was going on there, right? We’d still say that those places had been conquered, right? I have problems with your use of the word “imperial.” I don’t know anybody who talks about this whole problem in terms of imperialism. This is great-power politics, and what the Russians want is a regime in Kyiv that is attuned to Russian interests. It may be ultimately that the Russians would be willing to live with a neutral Ukraine, and that it won’t be necessary for Moscow to have any meaningful control over the government in Kyiv. It may be that they just want a regime that is neutral and not pro-American. When you said that no one’s talking about this as imperialism, in Putin’s speeches he specifically refers to the “territory of the former Russian Empire,” which he laments losing. So it seems like he’s talking about it. I think that’s wrong, because I think you’re quoting the first half of the sentence, as most people in the West do. He said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” And then he said, “Whoever wants it back has no brain.” He’s also saying that Ukraine is essentially a made-up nation, while he seems to be invading it, no? O.K., but put those two things together and tell me what that means. I’m just not too sure. He does believe it’s a made-up nation. I would note to him, all nations are made up. Any student of nationalism can tell you that. We invent these concepts of national identity. They’re filled with all sorts of myths. So he’s correct about Ukraine, just like he’s correct about the United States or Germany. The much more important point is: he understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. He can’t do that. What he’s doing in Ukraine is fundamentally different. He is obviously lopping off some territory. He’s going to take some territory away from Ukraine, in addition to what happened with Crimea, in 2014. Furthermore, he is definitely interested in regime change. Beyond that, it’s hard to say exactly what this will all lead to, except for the fact that he is not going to conquer all of Ukraine. It would be a blunder of colossal proportions to try to do that. I assume that you think if he were to try to do that, that would change your analysis of what we’ve witnessed. Absolutely. My argument is that he’s not going to re-create the Soviet Union or try to build a greater Russia, that he’s not interested in conquering and integrating Ukraine into Russia. It’s very important to understand that we invented this story that Putin is highly aggressive and he’s principally responsible for this crisis in Ukraine. The argument that the foreign-policy establishment in the United States, and in the West more generally, has invented revolves around the claim that he is interested in creating a greater Russia or a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. There are people who believe that when he is finished conquering Ukraine, he will turn to the Baltic states. He’s not going to turn to the Baltic states. First of all, the Baltic states are members of nato and— Is that a good thing? No. You’re saying that he’s not going to invade them in part because they’re part of nato, but they shouldn’t be part of nato. Yes, but those are two very different issues. I’m not sure why you’re connecting them. Whether I think they should be part of nato is independent of whether they are part of nato. They are part of nato. They have an Article 5 guarantee—that’s all that matters. Furthermore, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering the Baltic states. Indeed, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering Ukraine. It seems to me that if he wants to bring back anything, it’s the Russian Empire that predates the Soviet Union. He seems very critical of the Soviet Union, correct? Well, I don’t know if he’s critical. He said it in his big essay that he wrote last year, and he said in a recent speech that he essentially blames Soviet policies for allowing a degree of autonomy for Soviet Republics, such as Ukraine. But he also said, as I read to you before, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” That’s somewhat at odds with what you just said. I mean, he’s in effect saying that he misses the Soviet Union, right? That’s what he’s saying. What we’re talking about here is his foreign policy. The question you have to ask yourself is whether or not you think that this is a country that has the capability to do that. You realize that this is a country that has a G.N.P. that’s smaller than Texas. Countries try to do things that they don’t have the capabilities for all the time. You could have said to me, “Who thinks that America could get the Iraqi power system working quickly? We have all these problems in America.” And you would’ve been correct. But we still thought we could do it, and we still tried to do it, and we failed, right? America couldn’t do what it wanted during Vietnam, which I’m sure you would say is a reason not to fight these various wars—and I would agree—but that doesn’t mean that we were correct or rational about our capabilities. I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States.

#### Only reacting to Western expansion

**Chotiner** **22** (Isaac Chotiner; He is a staff writer at *The New Yorker*, where he is the principle contributor to Q.&A, a series of interviews and became a senior editor after graduating from the University of California, Davis; 3-1-22; “Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine”; “The New Yorker”; https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine)//SD

I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the nato Summit in Bucharest, where afterward nato issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of nato. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just nato expansion. nato expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat. You said that it’s about “turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.” I don’t put much trust or much faith in America “turning” places into liberal democracies. What if Ukraine, the people of Ukraine, want to live in a pro-American liberal democracy? If Ukraine becomes a pro-American liberal democracy, and a member of nato, and a member of the E.U., the Russians will consider that categorically unacceptable. If there were no nato expansion and no E.U. expansion, and Ukraine just became a liberal democracy and was friendly with the United States and the West more generally, it could probably get away with that. You want to understand that there is a three-prong strategy at play here: E.U. expansion, nato expansion, and turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy. You keep saying “turning Ukraine into a liberal democracy,” and it seems like that’s an issue for the Ukrainians to decide. nato can decide whom it admits, but we saw in 2014 that it appeared as if many Ukrainians wanted to be considered part of Europe. It would seem like almost some sort of imperialism to tell them that they can’t be a liberal democracy. It’s not imperialism; this is great-power politics. When you’re a country like Ukraine and you live next door to a great power like Russia, you have to pay careful attention to what the Russians think, because if you take a stick and you poke them in the eye, they’re going to retaliate. States in the Western hemisphere understand this full well with regard to the United States. The Monroe Doctrine, essentially. Of course. There’s no country in the Western hemisphere that we will allow to invite a distant, great power to bring military forces into that country. Right, but saying that America will not allow countries in the Western hemisphere, most of them democracies, to decide what kind of foreign policy they have—you can say that’s good or bad, but that is imperialism, right? We’re essentially saying that we have some sort of say over how democratic countries run their business. We do have that say, and, in fact, we overthrew democratically elected leaders in the Western hemisphere during the Cold War because we were unhappy with their policies. This is the way great powers behave. Of course we did, but I’m wondering if we should be behaving that way. When we’re thinking about foreign policies, should we be thinking about trying to create a world where neither the U.S. nor Russia is behaving that way? That’s not the way the world works. When you try to create a world that looks like that, you end up with the disastrous policies that the United States pursued during the unipolar moment. We went around the world trying to create liberal democracies. Our main focus, of course, was in the greater Middle East, and you know how well that worked out. Not very well. I think it would be difficult to say that America’s policy in the Middle East in the past seventy-five years since the end of the Second World War, or in the past thirty years since the end of the Cold War, has been to create liberal democracies in the Middle East. I think that’s what the Bush Doctrine was about during the unipolar moment. In Iraq. But not in the Palestinian territories, or Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, or anywhere else, right? No—well, not in Saudi Arabia and not in Egypt. To start with, the Bush Doctrine basically said that if we could create a liberal democracy in Iraq, it would have a domino effect, and countries such as Syria, Iran, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt would turn into democracies. That was the basic philosophy behind the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was not just designed to turn Iraq into a democracy. We had a much grander scheme in mind. We can debate how much the people who were in charge in the Bush Administration really wanted to turn the Middle East into a bunch of democracies, and really thought that was going to happen. My sense was that there was not a lot of actual enthusiasm about turning Saudi Arabia into a democracy. Well, I think focussing on Saudi Arabia is taking the easy case from your perspective. That was the most difficult case from America’s perspective, because Saudi Arabia has so much leverage over us because of oil, and it’s certainly not a democracy. But the Bush Doctrine, if you go look at what we said at the time, was predicated on the belief that we could democratize the greater Middle East. It might not happen overnight, but it would eventually happen. I guess my point would be actions speak louder than words, and, whatever Bush’s flowery speeches said, I don’t feel like the policy of the United States at any point in its recent history has been to try and insure liberal democracies around the world. There’s a big difference between how the United States behaved during the unipolar moment and how it’s behaved in the course of its history. I agree with you when you talk about American foreign policy in the course of its broader history, but the unipolar moment was a very special time. I believe that during the unipolar moment, we were deeply committed to spreading democracy. With Ukraine, it’s very important to understand that, up until 2014, we did not envision nato expansion and E.U. expansion as a policy that was aimed at containing Russia. Nobody seriously thought that Russia was a threat before February 22, 2014. nato expansion, E.U. expansion, and turning Ukraine and Georgia and other countries into liberal democracies were all about creating a giant zone of peace that spread all over Europe and included Eastern Europe and Western Europe. It was not aimed at containing Russia. What happened is that this major crisis broke out, and we had to assign blame, and of course we were never going to blame ourselves. We were going to blame the Russians. So we invented this story that Russia was bent on aggression in Eastern Europe. Putin is interested in creating a greater Russia, or maybe even re-creating the Soviet Union. Let’s turn to that time and the annexation of Crimea. I was reading an old article where you wrote, “According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine Crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian president Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a longstanding desire to resuscitate the Soviet Empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine as well as other countries in Eastern Europe.” And then you say, “But this account is wrong.” Does anything that’s happened in the last couple weeks make you think that account was closer to the truth than you might have thought? Oh, I think I was right. I think the evidence is clear that we did not think he was an aggressor before February 22, 2014. This is a story that we invented so that we could blame him. My argument is that the West, especially the United States, is principally responsible for this disaster. But no American policymaker, and hardly anywhere in the American foreign-policy establishment, is going to want to acknowledge that line of argument, and they will say that the Russians are responsible.

## Econ Ups

### Yes, Recession

#### Recession now---inflation, debt, and unsustainable work-at-home practices prove.

Tate 6/30, Kristin Tate is a visiting fellow at the Independent Women’s Voice and a libertarian writer, “Young Americans are in for a rude awakening with the coming recession,” 6/30/2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/3540529-young-americans-are-in-for-a-rude-awakening-with-the-coming-recession/, AJS

Societal legends are born out of challenging times. The Great Recession bore out not only the difficulties of American capitalism, but provided a myth among millennials of living through uniquely bad times. The current crop of young adults has known the comfort and ease their parents’ work afforded them. A serious recession is something for which most in that age cohort have done little planning. The unsustainability of work-from-home, low-output and overpaid jobs, massive student loan debts accumulated for prestige, and the effects of the pandemic will come to bear soon. For many young people who have known nothing but relative ease, the coming years will be a harsh reality check.

Many under-40s seemed to enjoy a “Goldilocks” view of the American economy. Any major pressure — from 9/11, to the 2008 financial crash, to massive money printing, to the pandemic — appeared to be solvable, for the most part, through a combination of economic stimulus spending and smoke and mirrors at the Federal Reserve. While each of the above came with its own economic pain, a low-inflation, moderate-growth future appeared inevitable for millennials and Generation Z — especially for those with a college education. However, this type of economic growth cannot remain forever. The current runaway inflation shows just the tip of the iceberg of federal irresponsibility, which we are already paying for as a massive unlevied tax.

The U.S. will tumble into a full-blown recession in 2023 as inflation soars, 70 percent of economists predict. The past two years are a reminder that economic policy has consequences. The pandemic ushered in full-force Keynesian economics. The Fed grew the money supply by a whopping 42 percent in 2020 and 2021, while keeping interest rates low. Trillions of dollars in emergency pandemic funding, capped by President Biden’s 2021 American Rescue Plan, saturated the economy with cheap dollars.

At first, it appeared that the rapid growth of government spending, money printing and federal power that ballooned during the pandemic would aid white-collar Americans. Being able to work from home or receive enhanced unemployment was an extension of the Goldilocks fallacy. Even the inflationary proposed partial forgiveness of student loan debt tracks along the same general benefit that college-educated young people derived from the pandemic. But just as 2008 burst their parents’ dream of real estate empires, so will 2022 or 2023 tear apart the uniquely advantageous position that young, upper-middle class Americans currently enjoy.

When the reckoning comes, it will be especially harsh on millennials and Gen Zers, who will be left without the safety net to which they have grown accustomed. The white-collar lifestyle of $14 margaritas, DoorDash and their parents subsidizing a tiny yet expensive apartment in New York City, Washington or San Francisco is not sustainable for most families during a recession. This is not to say that a young person can’t enjoy a night out with friends or an expensive avocado toast every once in a while. However, the lack of foresight shown by many in the youngest two generations is unique in recent history.

All hope is not lost for young people; after all, some have recession-resistant jobs or have been responsible with their money. However, that won’t be the case for most. A pre-pandemic survey found most Gen Zers have less than $1,000 in their bank accounts, and almost half have nothing at all. The 22.5 million young people under 35 who attended college carry an average of $28,000 in student loan debt. Millennials also carry over $27,000 in average non-mortgage debt.

Spending habits among the young are heavier on convenience, something that will come crashing down when the next recession hits. Almost three-quarters of millennials and 65 percent of Generation Z live paycheck to paycheck. Rapidly increasing rental and mortgage costs and the overall pressure of inflation will be the coup de grace of a 1970s-esque stagflation spiral. The last two decades have allowed for a false understanding of cost-of-living expenses that is unsustainable.

At the same time, the hope of working from home indefinitely will begin to dry up. When the recession hits, employers will prioritize essential and practical jobs over self-important ones. Layoffs will ensue and other positions will die through attrition. Working from home and demanding large salaries for relatively easy work will be increasingly difficult.

Just as the lean Carter presidency years created a generation of conservative leaders, President Biden is looking at a similar fate. Biden declared that he wants to stand out in history. Young people may experience a moment similar to one that their parents did in the 1980s; they can double down on failure under Biden, or entertain voting for a young, energetic and competent Republican.

And for those who are currently privileged, there will be a chance to understand a crucial lesson: The laws of economics are real. Efforts by Democrats to ignore them may cause voters to abandon the party

### No, Recession

#### No recession---survey data recovery now

Fisher Investments Editorial Staff 22 (Fisher Investments Editorial Staff, Fisher Investments is a fee-only investment adviser serving institutional and private clients globally, published 6/27/22, accessed 7/23/22, “June’s Global Flash PMIs Still Look Ok”, <https://www.fisherinvestments.com/en-us/marketminder/junes-global-flash-pmis-still-look-ok>) KCabrera

Another month, another round of flash purchasing managers’ indexes (PMIs) giving an early read into major **economies’** business activity. Though they **mostly ticked down in June**, prompting more **recessionary chatter**, their **levels** still **indicate overall expansion**. It may not be gangbusters, but stocks don’t need perfection to mount a recovery from this year’s downturn—just for reality to beat dreary expectations. PMIs are surveys that aim to measure growth’s breadth. Readings above 50 indicate the majority of surveyed **firms reported expanding business activity**, with growth (and contraction) **theoretically accelerating the further readings drift from that marker**. PMIs don’t say anything about how much their businesses grew (or shrank), only that they did, so they are a timely but loose estimate of economic activity at best. Among the various readings, the composite PMI combines services and manufacturing, but it is a narrower measure of their “output” that focuses only on production. The services and manufacturing PMIs are broader, including new orders, backlogs, suppliers’ delivery times and employment. That is why, for example, the composites for June’s US, UK and eurozone PMIs can be below each of their services and manufacturing PMIs. Exhibit 1 shows major economies’ PMIs remain above 50—though they are down from the spring, implying deceleration (Japan excepted). The US and eurozone’s June **flash composites**, released with only 85% – 90% of responses in, fell to the low 50s, **continuing a generally slower trend.** This includes both services, which comprise the bulk of developed market economies, and manufacturing. But while low-50s PMIs aren’t historically robust, they generally coincide with pedestrian growth. Exhibit 1: Major Economy PMIs \*\*\*image omitted\*\*\* Source: FactSet and S&P Global, as of 6/23/2022. Flash PMIs are preliminary estimates based on 85% – 90% of responses. Also note, the downward trend isn’t global—Japan’s composite PMI rose and the UK’s was flat. Japan’s lift was services-based as COVID restrictions eased there. Reopening-related boosts helped buoy UK services, too, as more workers returned to the office and patronized surrounding businesses. However, Japanese and UK **manufacturing weakened alongside the rest of the developed world** as Chinese lockdowns hit global supply chains. As a whole, the picture here appears mixed. Business activity growth is less broad-based. But through mid-June at least, the pockets of strength seemingly outnumbered the pockets of weakness. Whether that translates to actual economic growth, we will see when output data roll in. For many, **this isn’t exactly consoling.** As we wrote in early June for the eurozone, there are some discrepancies between “soft” survey data and “hard” sales and volume data, with some signs of contraction in the latter. In the US and UK, May retail sales fell -0.3% m/m (nominal) and -0.5% (real), respectively.[i] But we don’t think this is conclusive, as it may reflect a continuing shift back to services spending from goods—**a return to normal, not necessarily weakness**. Hard services data tend to lag, which is why timelier PMIs are helpful and looking at both provides a fuller picture, if only in broad brushstrokes. Based on our read of all the data so far, it is premature to declare a recession is underway. Some quantitative efforts to derive GDP from monthly indicators—like the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow—might seem to disagree, but these models aren’t air-tight. GDPNow currently predicts 0.3% annualized Q2 growth given available data.[ii] But the most telling component, personal consumption expenditures—71% of GDP—won’t be released until month end, and that is just May’s number.[iii] More broadly, these nowcast models are young, with a spotty record of accuracy. The New York Fed’s proved so inaccurate that they have temporarily ceased publication, pending methodological improvements. The St. Louis Fed’s attempt currently estimates 3.9% annualized growth in Q2, but neither it nor the Atlanta Fed’s model predicted Q1’s inventory-fueled GDP contraction.[iv] Absent a foolproof tool, investors must survey the entire landscape and make their best judgments. For now, we are inclined to interpret PMIs as more evidence economies aren’t uniformly weak despite well-documented struggles. Notably, though, even **survey data have some weak points** worth monitoring. Deteriorating new orders may suggest demand is faltering—**but it is too early to tell**. Relative services strength may be fading, but whether that is normalization following the initial reopening boom or something worse—e.g., cost of living pressures taking a more lasting toll—remains to be seen. Meanwhile, manufacturing’s downtrend, beset by component shortages, could reverse as supply chains recover. Some businesses, particularly in the consumer world, apparently overstocked trying to compensate amid surging goods demand. They may just have inventory overhangs they need to work through—a more temporary hiccup than needing to get lean to correct prior excess. We also see some other encouraging nuggets. The PMI surveys indicate falling backorders, which could be signaling easing supply chain and price pressures. This may be occurring as headwinds from China’s choppy reopening fade. One hint: The New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, which aggregates transportation costs, input-output prices and other measures—like PMIs’ delivery times, backlogs and inventories—to gauge the overall intensity of bottlenecks’ disruption on world trade. (Exhibit 2) While still at lofty levels, **it has started subsiding and may be past its peak**. Exhibit 2: Global Supply Chain Pressures Elevated, but Easing \*\*\*image omitted\*\*\* Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as of 5/18/2022. Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, January 1998 – May 2022. For investors, the most salient aspect of the latest PMI releases may be their accompanying bearish sentiment. Given the market environment, it isn’t surprising. But we still think it is notable that PMI coverage widely extrapolates imminent recession—which the data don’t confirm, at least yet. The evidence, as we have explored, is more mixed. **While recession is possible, we think the global economy’s resilience is just as remarkable given the challenges it has faced year to date.** This is an underappreciated positive to us. Recession uncertainty has undoubtedly weighed on markets lately. But by the same token, it lowers the expectations bar reality needs to clear to surprise stocks positively. In our view, increasing economic clarity in the second half—even if it just muddles through—will likely provide relief.

#### No recession---impossible to coordinate the next one and responses solve

Cristino et al 20 (Cláudio Tadeu Cristino, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Validation, Visualization, Writing – review & editing, Piotr Żebrowski, Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – review & editing, Matthias Wildemeersch, Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, published 5/7/20, accessed 7/23/22, “Assessing the time intervals between economic recessions”, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232615>) KCabrera

Recessions are economic contractions following a period of economic expansion. They are part of the business cycle, **and do not feature a regular periodicity**. Market adjustments and policy measures are capable to revitalize the economy and **turn around the trend of economic decline**. In the modern economic history of the U.S., policy makers have tried time and time again to address unemployment and **declining incomes with recovery measures** in the New Deal, the employment act, new institutional frameworks, the Bretton Woods agreement, etc. [1, 2]. In addition to reforms and new regulations, different instruments of **fiscal control can be activated**, such as adjustments in taxation, public expenditure and debt management to **foster economic growth** [3]. The efficiency of all these policies can be measured with so-called fiscal multipliers, which behave differently during expansions and recessions [4, 5]. However, these **multipliers do not allow us to estimate the time and probability of the next recession.** The lifetime of a system is defined as the time that a system can carry out its function before going into a failure state [6, 7]. In this work, the failure state corresponds with a recession event, and the age of the system is the time that the system has already worked properly, i.e., the time that the economy is in expansion. There are multiple approaches to predict business cycle turning points, such as econometric techniques [8], the spread between short-term and long-term interest rates captured in the yield function [9], or stochastic simulation [10, 11]. Typically, the probability of a recession is determined based on the several indicator variables, such as stock prices, credit market activity, or employment and interest rate [11]. These techniques are valuable, **but they do not capture explicitly the effect** of system age, system aging, or the effects of policy and market interventions on the state of the economy. There is in fact evidence that the termination probability of recessions is dependent on its duration [12, 13]. This dependence can be captured by different types of survival models, such as the proportional hazard model [14] and the accelerated failure time model [15], which include the effect of covariates in the hazard function. Aforementioned models are however not able to include the effect of interventions following an event on system age. Business cycle durations have typically been modeled using Markov switching processes [16, 17]. Here, we use an alternative approach based on Generalized Renewal Processes (GRP) to model the inter-arrival times of recessions. This method allows us to integrate explicitly the effect of policy interventions and to determine if aging is a real process happening in economic systems. GRPs integrate simultaneously two sources of stochastic variability in system performance: deterioration through aging and restoration by means of policy interventions. **System deterioration** can occur through different types of aging processes. No aging indicates that the age of the system has no effect on the residual lifetime. The no-aging property implies a system with no memory, a constant failure rate, and lifetimes distributed according to the exponential distribution. In reliability analysis, positive aging is much more common and means that the expected residual lifetime decreases with age. System restoration deals with repair actions that improve the system after failure. The literature often distinguishes between perfect repair and minimal repair [18]. Perfect repair is applicable, for instance, to engineering systems that consist of a single component that can be replaced, resulting in a system as good as new. Minimal repair requires the replacement of only these components that failed; minimal repair is a reasonable assumption for systems consisting of multiple components all of which have their own failure properties, leaving the system in a state as bad as before the failure. Minimal repair and perfect repair are however specific cases and in realistic settings the degree of restoration can be better described by general repair and the corresponding stochastic process, the GRP. The effectiveness of interventions in general repair can take arbitrary values, and general renewal theory extends the classical renewal theory by including the notion of rejuvenation, indicating the performance of the system after interventions. This idea was firstly presented in [19] and requires to introduce the concept of virtual age, a function that reflects how interventions affect the real age of the system. In the literature, a Weibull-GRP (WGRP) model is usually fitted to observed data in order to infer lifetime probabilities [20–23]. The restoration process is commonly captured by a rejuvenation parameter [22, 24, 25], whereas the deterioration of the system is reflected by the shape and scale parameters of the Weibull distribution regardless of the restoration process [20–22]. The GRP can also be used in an optimization context, where policies are searched for that minimize intervention costs while maintaining certain levels of system performance [24, 26–28]. In reliability analysis and engineering, the Weibull distribution has typically been used to describe the functioning of a serial system that operates well as long as all components operate correctly [29]. In this work, we propose to model the arrival time of recessions by means of a GRP based on the Gumbel distribution. The Gumbel distribution is able to describe a parallel system that stops operating once all components fail, and we use the abstraction of a parallel system as a stylized representation of the economy. The duration of an expansion period is affected by market adjustments taking place during the preceding recession as well as by the policies and reforms introduced to mitigate the causes of this recession. We therefore argue that the periods between consecutive recessions do not constitute a stationary process. We deduce the distribution of the GRP based on the Gumbel distribution, and show how the parameters of the statistical model can be estimated. Importantly, we propose a novel goodness of fit test to demonstrate that the observed recessions of the American and European markets can be represented by the Gumbel-based GRP. We show that the GRP outperforms several stationary distributions, and in addition to the recession incidence rate over time, we also estimate the expected time of the next recession.

### AT: Decline Causes War

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war---Covid has weakened countries.

Walt 20, Stephen Walt is the Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?,” 5/13/2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/>, AJS

But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace.

Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen.

Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede.

#### No impact to recession---COVID proves

The Investopedia team 22 (Investopedia contributors come from a range of backgrounds, and over 20+ years there have been thousands of expert writers and editors who have contributed, last updated (no publish date) 6/16/22, accessed 7/23/22, “A Review of Past Recessions”, investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/past-recessions.asp) KCabrera

The Own Goal Recession: May 1937–June 1938 Duration: 13 months GDP decline: 10% 5 Peak unemployment rate: 20% 5 Reasons and causes: Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies had **secured a recovery from the Great Depression** after 1933, albeit an uneven and incomplete one. In 1936-**1937 policymakers changed course**, more preoccupied with cutting budget deficits and heading off inflation than with the dangers of a depressive relapse. 5 Following a tax increase in 1935 and Social Security payroll deductions starting in 1937, the budget deficit shrank from 5.4% of GDP in 1936 to 0.1% of GDP by 1938. 6 7 Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve in 1936 doubled the reserve requirement ratios for banks, thus curbing lending with the stated aim of preventing "an injurious credit expansion." 5 Perhaps most damagingly of all, the U.S. Treasury began the same year to sterilize gold inflows, ending brisk money supply growth that had supported the expansion. 8 Industrial production began falling in September; it would decline 32% in the course of the recession. The **stock market crashed** in October. The recession ended after policymakers rolled back the increase in reserve requirements and gold sterilization as well as fiscal austerity. 5 The V-Day Recession: February 1945–October 1945 Duration: Eight months GDP decline: 10.9% 9 Peak unemployment rate: 3.8% 10 Reasons and causes: The 1945 recession reflected massive cuts in U.S. government spending and employment toward the end and immediately after World War II. Federal spending fell 40% in 1946 and 38% in 1947 while the private sector's output grew rapidly. 11 The **severity of the downturn remains open to question** because much of the eliminated spending represented wartime production that did not serve to increase living standards. 12 The elimination of price controls in 1946 artificially depressed output as adjusted for inflation, while the unemployment rate remained low in part because women left the workforce in large numbers (and often unwillingly). 13 14 15 The Post-War Brakes Tap Recession: November 1948–October 1949 Duration: 11 months GDP decline: 1.7% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 7.9% 17 Reasons and Causes: The first phase of the post-war boom was in **some ways comparable to the economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.** Amid a backlog of consumer demand suppressed during the war and a shortage of production capacity, the collapse of wartime price controls fueled an abrupt surge of inflation by mid-1946. 18 The annualized inflation rate rose from 3.3% in June 1946 to 11.6% two months later and 19% at its peak in April 1947. 19 Policymakers only responded in the second half of 1947, and when they did their efforts to tighten credit ultimately led to a relatively mild recession as consumers and producers retrenched. 20 The M\*A\*S\*H\* Recession: July 1953–May 1954 Duration: 10 months GDP decline: 2.7% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 5.9% 17 Reasons and causes: The wind-down of the Korean War caused government spending to decline dramatically, lowering the federal budget deficit from 1.7% of GDP in fiscal 1953 to 0.3% a year later. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy in 1953. 21 The Investment Bust Recession: August 1957–April 1958 Duration: Eight months GDP decline: 3.7% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 7.4% 17 Reasons and causes: The end of the Korean War unleashed a global investment boom marked by a surge in exports of U.S. capital goods. 22 The Fed responded by tightening monetary policy as the inflation rate rose from 0.4% in March 1956 to 3.7% a year later. 21 19 Fiscal policy focused on limiting budget deficits produced a surplus of 0.7% of GDP in 1957. 21 The 1957 Asian Flu pandemic killed 70,000 to 100,000 Americans in 1957, and industrial production slumped late that year and early in 1958. 23 The dramatic drop in domestic demand and evolving consumer expectations led to the failure of the Ford Edsel, the beginning of the end for Detroit's auto industry dominance. 24 The sharp worldwide recession contributed to a **foreign trade deficit**. The recession ended after policymakers eased fiscal and monetary constraints on growth. 21 The 'Rolling Adjustment' Recession: April 1960–February 1961 Duration: 10 months GDP decline: 1.6% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 6.9% 17 Reasons and causes: This relatively mild recession was named for the so-called "rolling adjustment" in U.S. industrial sectors tied to consumers' diminished demand for domestic autos amid growing competition from inexpensive imports. Like most other recessions, it was preceded by higher interest rates, with the Fed increasing the federal funds rate from 1.75% in mid-1958 to 4% by the end of 1959. 25 Fiscal policy also tightened at the end of President Dwight Eisenhower's second term, from a deficit of 2.6% of GDP in 1959 to a surplus of 0.1% a year later. 26 The Guns and Butter Recession: December 1969–November 1970 Duration: 11 months GDP decline: 0.6% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 5.9% 17 Reasons and causes: Military spending increased in the late 1960s amid growing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and alongside high expenditures on domestic policy initiatives. 27 As a result, the federal budget deficit rose from 1.1% of GDP in 1967 to 2.9% in 1968, while inflation increased from 3.1% in 1967 to 4.3% a year later and 5.3% by 1970. The Federal Reserve increased the federal funds rate from 5% in March 1968 to more than 9% by August 1969. By early 1971, the Fed had lowered the federal funds rate back below 4%, aiding the recovery. 26 The Oil Embargo Recession: November 1973–March 1975 Duration: 16 months GDP decline: 3% 28 Peak unemployment rate: 8.6% 17 Reasons and causes: This long, deep recession began following the start of the Arab Oil Embargo, which would quadruple crude prices. That tipped the balance for an economy struggling with the devaluation of the dollar amid high U.S. trade and budget deficits and slipping domestic crude output. 29 The collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement fixing currency exchange rates contributed to a rise in U.S. inflation from 2.4% in August 1972 to 7.4% a year later, causing the Fed to double the federal funds rate to 10% between late 1972 and mid-1973. 19 30 After increasing the federal funds rate to 13% in the first half of 1974, the Fed cut it to 5.25% in under a year. 28 Inflation and unemployment remained elevated after the recession ended, ushering in stagflation. Unemployment reached 9% in May of 1975, after the declared end of the recession. 17 The Iran and Volcker Recession, Part 1: January 1980–July 1980 Duration: Six months GDP decline: 2.2% 31 Peak unemployment rate: 7.8% 17 Reasons and causes: Accommodative monetary policy aimed at alleviating rising unemployment pushed U.S. inflation to 7% by early 1979, just before the Iranian Revolution caused oil prices to double. 32 The Federal Reserve was already raising rates when Paul Volcker was named Fed chair in August 1979, and the rate went from 10.5% at the time of his appointment to 17.5% by April 1980. 33 This short recession formally ended as the Fed dropped the fed funds rate back down to 9.5% by August of 1980, but inflation stayed high and the Volcker Fed wasn't done. Part 2 of Double-Dip Recession: July 1981–November 1982 Duration: 16 months GDP decline: 2.9% 31 Peak unemployment rate: 10.8% 17 Reasons and causes: By the fourth quarter of 1980 inflation was up to 11.1%, prompting the Federal Reserve to raise the fed funds rate to 19% by July 1981. 33 As the downturn worsened and joblessness climbed, Volcker resisted repeated demands in Congress to change course. 34 By October 1982 inflation had declined to 5%, while unemployment would remain above 10% until mid-1983. 35 17 Most economists today accept Volcker's arguments at the time that failure to control inflation and restore the Fed's credibility would have led to continued economic underperformance. 36 The Gulf War Recession: July 1990–March 1991 Duration: Eight months GDP decline: 1.5% 37 Peak unemployment rate: 6.8% 17 Reasons and causes: This relatively mild recession began a month before Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the resulting oil price shock may have contributed to a frustratingly lackluster recovery. The Fed had raised the federal funds rate from 6.5% in February 1988 to 9.75% in May 1989 in an effort to contain inflation, which rose from 2.2% in 1986 to 3.9% for 1990. 38 The Dot-Bomb Recession: March 2001–November 2001 Duration: Eight months GDP decline: 0.3% Peak unemployment rate: 5.5% 17 Reasons and causes: The collapse of the dotcom bubble contributed to one of the mildest recessions on record following what was then the longest economic expansion in U.S. history. 39 The Fed raised the fed funds rate from 4.75% in early 1999 to 6.5% by July 2000. The Sept. 11 attacks and the associated economic disruptions may have hastened the recession's end by encouraging the Fed to keep cutting the fed funds rate. The benchmark rate reached a low of 1% by mid-2003. 40 The Great Recession: December 2007–June 2009 Duration: Eighteen months GDP decline: 4.3% 41 Peak unemployment rate: 9.5% 41 Reasons and causes: The nationwide downturn in U.S. housing prices triggered a global financial crisis, a bear market in stocks that had the S&P 500 down 57% at the lows, and the worst economic downturn since the recession of 1937-38. 41 Global investment flows into the U.S. had kept market rates low, likely encouraging unscrupulous mortgage underwriting and mortgage-backed securities marketing practices. 42 Oil prices spiked to record highs by mid-2008 and then crashed, depressing the U.S. oil industry. The COVID-19 Recession: February 2020–April 2020 Duration: Two months Reasons and causes: The COVID-19 pandemic spread to the U.S. in March 2020, and the resulting travel and work restrictions caused employment to plummet, triggering an unusually short but sharp recession. 43 The unemployment rate climbed from 3.5% in February 2020 to 14.7% in April 2020 but was back below 4% by the end of 2021, capped by $5 trillion in pandemic relief spending. 17 44 In addition, quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet from $4.1 trillion in February 2020 to nearly $9 trillion by the end of 2021, complementing a federal funds rate that remained near zero until March 2022. 45 What Is the Average Length of a Recession? The U.S. has experienced **34 recessions** since 1857 according to the NBER, varying in length from two months (February to April 2020) to more than five years (October 1873 to March 1879). The average recession has lasted 17 months, while the six recessions since 1980 have lasted less than 10 months on average. 1 Which Stocks Tend Fare Better During a Recession? Companies in the consumer staples, health care, and utilities sectors, which see **relatively small fluctuations** in demand for economic reasons, tend to **fare best** during recessions, and their stocks have **outperformed** during past downturns as a result. 46 47 Do Recessions Always Coincide With Bear Markets? A bear market is commonly defined as a sustained drop of 20% or more from a market peak. Of the 25 bear markets since 1928, 14 have overlapped with recessions. 48 \*\*\*image omitted\*\*\* The Bottom Line As the history of recessions over the past century suggests, they're almost always preceded by monetary policy tightening in the form of rising interest rates. Fiscal contractions, whether they involve lower government spending, higher taxes, or both, have also played a role. This is not to automatically deprecate such policies when they lead to a recession. In some cases, as during the 1970s, the long-run alternative to immediate economic pain may be even less palatable. In others, as with the end of World War II and the Korean War, there may be no easy way or no will to find immediate alternatives to high military spending. That doesn't change the fact that **most modern recessions** have occurred in response to some combination of rising interest rates, lower budget deficits, and higher energy prices.

### AT: Diversionary Theory

#### Diversionary theory is wrong---too big a gamble and countries weak

Walt 20, Stephen Walt is the Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?,” 5/13/2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/>, AJS

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose.

This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too.

### AT: Military Keynesianism

#### Military Keynesianism is wrong---war fails to generate enough growth and other methods solve.

Walt 20, Stephen Walt is the Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?,” 5/13/2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/>, AJS

Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure.

I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do.

for the next generation, and with good cause.

## Climate Change Ups

### No Extinction

#### Climate change won’t cause extinction---Recent decrease in natural disasters proves.

Puckett 21, (Jakob, An energy-policy analyst and a Young Voices associate contributor. “Don’t Buy the U.N. Climate Change Conference’s Scary Stories”, National Review, 10-30-2021, https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/10/dont-buy-the-un-climate-change-conferences-scary-stories/ 7-23-2022)///LD

Starting tomorrow, on Halloween, government leaders from around the world will meet in Glasgow, Scotland, for the annual U.N. Climate Change Conference, which this year will feature some of its [scariest](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-58130705) stories yet. The only problem is that when you take the mask off the harrowing claims that climate change poses an imminent existential threat to humanity, they don’t hold up. The most dire climate-change predictions, which fuel the apocalyptic discourse that surrounds the issue, stem from a climate model known as RCP 8.5. According to RCP 8.5, by the year 2100, the Earth will [warm](https://climatenexus.org/climate-change-news/rcp-8-5-business-as-usual-or-a-worst-case-scenario/) 4.3 degrees Celsius, causing sea levels to surge and making many countries too hot to inhabit. But models are only as solid as the assumptions on which they rest, and RCP 8.5’s assumptions are wild, to put it mildly. The model [assumes](https://issues.org/climate-change-scenarios-lost-touch-reality-pielke-ritchie/) that, despite coal’s declining market position and [usage](https://financialpost.com/opinion/ross-mckitrick-the-flaw-in-relying-on-a-worst-case-scenario-climate-model), and despite [projections](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-coal-demand-by-scenario-2010-2040) that it will [continue to decline](https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2020/overview-and-key-findings), worldwide per capita coal use will [rise](https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abcdd2/pdf#page=8) three- to six-fold over the next 50 years, coming to once again power our economies and heat our homes. It assumes that [liquefied coal](https://issues.org/climate-change-scenarios-lost-touch-reality-pielke-ritchie/) will even fuel our cars. It [assumes](https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abcdd2/pdf#page=10) that the rebirth of the coal industry will power so much growth that, by 2100, the poorest country on Earth today will have a higher GDP than today’s wealthiest countries currently do (while paradoxically also being too hot to inhabit). And it assumes that economic growth will be much [less](https://judithcurry.com/2015/12/13/a-closer-look-at-scenario-rcp8-5/) energy-efficient than it is [today](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.GDP.PUSE.KO.PP.KD?locations=US-DE-JP-CN-CA), which would represent the reversal of a decades-long trend. It should go without saying that none of these are even remotely safe assumptions. Similarly, many dire predictions about climate change’s effects on weather patterns are overwrought. It is true that the [latest report](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Chapter_11.pdf) from the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes that fire weather, heavy precipitation, ecological and agricultural droughts, and heat waves are [increasing](https://rogerpielkejr.substack.com/p/how-to-understand-the-new-ipcc-report-1e3) in frequency. But it is also true that while heat waves have become more frequent since 1960, the Dust Bowl era of the 1930s remains the [peak](https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf#page=191) period of extreme heat in the U.S. Similarly, while weather conducive to wildfires has become more frequent, the global land area burned by wildfires has steadily [decreased](https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_fires_forests_and_the_future_report.pdf#page=8) since the early 1900s, and much of the recent [damage](https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-activists-blow-smoke-on-wildfire-fears-adaptation-land-11635367688?mod=hp_opin_pos_4#cxrecs_s) has been due to poor forest-management practices. What’s more, there’s plenty of good news that can’t be fit into a spooky climate-change story. The IPCC’s most recent report notes [no discernible long-term increase](https://rogerpielkejr.substack.com/p/how-to-understand-the-new-ipcc-report-1e3) in flooding, hydrological and meteorological droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes, winter storms, extreme winds, thunderstorms, lightning, or hail. And humanity is better protected than it once was from those natural disasters that do happen: A recent study published in the peer-reviewed journal Global Environmental Change found that economic losses caused by climate-related disasters [dropped](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378019300378) 80 percent from 1980 to 2016. If you can ignore the overblown rhetoric, there are fundamental truths to be reckoned with: Climate change is real, and human activity does indeed contribute to it. But irresponsible fearmongering only makes the problem harder to address. According to the best evidence, the world is on track to hit emissions and warming levels that, as of a couple of years ago, would have been considered a success. For instance, according to leading [industry](https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Energy-and-innovation/Outlook-for-Energy/Emissions) [publications](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2020.pdf#page=7), energy-related-emissions projections are in line with the (much cooler) climate [model](https://asr.science.energy.gov/publications/program-docs/RCP4.5-Pathway.pdf) RCP 4.5, which the 2018 U.S. National Climate Assessment [heralded](https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/national-climate-assessment-reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions-will) as a [low-emissions](https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/29/) policy-success scenario. It’s likely that global “peak per capita CO2 emissions” were reached several years ago. Major independent energy-research organizations such as the International Energy Agency predict that annual per capita CO2 emissions will [decline](https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerpielke/2020/01/18/the-best-news-on-climate-youve-never-heard/) in the decades to come, and it’s [likely](https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerpielke/2019/11/30/global-carbon-dioxide-emissions-are-on-the-brink-of-a-long-plateau/?sh=470a8e61338d) that global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are on the brink of a long plateau. The best computer models [predict](https://youtu.be/DfHTudcfrUU?t=1802) that by 2100, the Earth will be 2.2 degrees Celsius warmer than it was in 1850. That will certainly cause environmental changes, but it doesn’t constitute an existential threat. Nor are we humans without tools to ameliorate the problem. Adaptive engineering, [carbon](https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/RSTREET243.pdf)–[offset](https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/newsroom/dem/press/release/growing-climate-solutions-act-passes-us-senate) and [water](https://www.hoover.org/research/west-needs-water-markets) markets, and the continued growth of more environmentally conscious ways of producing the goods and services needed for modern life can all lessen climate change and its effects. So, as Halloween arrives amid the U.N. Climate Change Conference this year, leaders should ditch the Grim Reaper costumes and don more reasonable attire. With level heads and the right policies, they can both protect the environment and provide a better life for billions around the globe.

#### Adaptation solves the impacts of climate change---Executive action solves

**Wetzel 22,** (Corryn Wetzel is a freelance science journalist based in Brooklyn. Her work has also appeared in Audubon magazine, National Geographic and others.“We Are Changing Climate Faster Than We Can Adapt, New IPCC Report Warns”, 3-2-2022, Smithsonian Magazine, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/we-are-changing-climate-faster-than-we-can-adapt-new-ipcc-report-warns-180979655/> 7-23-2022)///LD

Humans are changing the climate too rapidly for nature to keep up, according to a new United Nations (UN) report released on Monday. Unless greenhouse gas emissions are quickly slashed, both humans and wildlife will no longer adapt to the dangers of a warming planet. The latest report from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is based on years of research from hundreds of scientists and follows previous landmark assessments on the global threat of climate change. The new 3,675-page report authored by 270 researchers from nearly 70 nations, concluded that human-caused climate change is happening faster and causing more damage than researchers previously expected, according to Sara Kiley Watson for Popular Science. The report is the second of three reviews from the IPCC. “With fact upon fact, this report reveals how people and the planet are getting clobbered by climate change,” says UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in a statement. “Nearly half of humanity is living in the danger zone—now. Many ecosystems are at the point of no return—now. Unchecked carbon pollution is forcing the world’s most vulnerable on a frog march to destruction—now.” Climate change is not a future abstract threat, per the new report, and is already harming communities and ecosystems around the world. In 2019, extreme weather like storms and floods displaced more than 13 million people across Asia and Africa, according to Brad Plumer and Raymond Zhong for the New York Times. Heat and drought are threatening the food and water supply for millions of people, and rising sea levels are encroaching on coastal communities. In recent years, more individuals have been forced to deal with extreme weather events linked to climate change, like the deadly heatwave that hit the western United States last summer. Anthropogenic warming increased the likelihood of floods that swept through parts of Europe last year by up to nine times and made Australia's devastating fire seasons 30 percent more likely.

“One of the most striking conclusions in our report is that we’re seeing adverse impacts that are much more widespread and much more negative than expected,” Camille Parmesan, an ecologist at the University of Texas, Austin, and one of the researchers involved in the report, tells the Times. The report found some regions are feeling the impacts of climate change more than others. Between 2010 and 2020, floods, droughts, and storms killed 15 times more people in very vulnerable parts of Africa, South Asia, and Central and South America, than in other parts of the world, per Matt McGrath for BBC. A warmer planet also presents new health risks, including the spread of mosquito-borne illnesses like dengue fever to billions more people. “This report is a dire warning about the consequences of inaction,” says Hoesung Lee, chair of the IPCC, in a statement. “Half measures are no longer an option.” The new analysis comes roughly 100 days since the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, where scientists and world leaders aimed to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius and stave off the worst effects of climate change. Since humans started burning fossil fuels in the 19th century, global temperatures have climbed an average of 1.1 degrees Celsius, or 2 degrees Fahrenheit. Currently, the world is currently on pace to warm somewhere between 2 degrees and 3 degrees Celsius by the end of the century, and a few degrees can have a big impact on the planet.

If global warming is limited to just 2 degrees Celsius by 2100, for example, around a fifth of land species will be at high risk of extinction, per CNN’s Rachel Ramirez. If that jumps to 4 degrees of warming, half of those animals will be threatened. Some animals, like corals, may already be out of time to adapt.

Though many of the impacts of global warming are "irreversible," according to the report, scientists behind the assessment say that there is still time to act. Certain leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have vowed to limit warming to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius to meet that goal, but few nations have offered specific plans. To limit warming to that threshold, humans need to cut global greenhouse gas emissions nearly in half by 2030 and come close to eliminating their fossil-fuel emissions by 2050.

“Now is the time to turn rage into action,” Guterres says in a statement. “Every fraction of a degree matters. Every voice can make a difference. And every second counts.”

## Heg Ups

### Heg Unsustainable

#### US hegemony’s unsustainable --- shifts in power means no country is willing to follow the US.

Mathew Burrows and Robert Manning 20, Burrows is a former worker at the CIA and the State Department and the director of the *Strategic Foresight Initiative*, Manning is a Senior Fellow at the *Atlantic Council* and formerly served as a senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Asia, “What Happens When America Is No Longer the Undisputed Super Power?”, 8/17/2020 <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-happens-when-america-no-longer-undisputed-super-power-166828> , accessed 7-23-22, Wpeng

THE TRIFECTA of the worst pandemic in a century, the worst economic crisis since the 1930s, and civil unrest not seen since the 1960s are inspiring predictions of the diminution of American power and an accelerated fin de siècle breakdown of the post-Cold War order. This predicament has given rise to a panoply of essays and reports, a series of them in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs alone, debating “The World After the Pandemic,” with variations on how the United States must, phoenix-like, shape a new order. One recent example that is emblematic of the Washington foreign policy mainstream emanates from the Council on Foreign Relations. It is entitled The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy, by Robert Blackwill and Thomas Wright.

While it articulately sketches the damage wrought by COVID-19, a collapsed economy, and the challenges ahead, like many of its predecessors, it rests on some dubious assumptions. It also appears to substantially discount both the role of the United States as a causal factor—not least, the cost of Donald Trump’s systematic efforts to undo the multilateral system—and the degree of difficulty of repairing a broken U.S. political system that is an impediment to restoring U.S. stature. Similarly underestimated are the costs to the moral authority and legitimacy of U.S. leadership resulting from U.S. political tribalism and behavior in the world this century, qualitatively worsened by the wrecking ball of the current president. Moreover, their recommendations often consist of well-trodden bromides that fail to acknowledge the difficult reforms required to achieve them.

Chief among the flawed assumptions is their belief that perpetual U.S. primacy is both desirable and possible, the “indispensable nation”—a cliché well past its sell-by date that ex-diplomat Nicholas Burns repeated in a recent Harvard Magazine essay. This is a core assumption to most grand strategy plans. They grossly underestimate the degree to which U.S. stature has diminished, while at the same time overestimating U.S. leverage and, crucially, domestic support for it. It is a testament to American leadership in the post-World War II period that so many countries were able to rise, with China chief among them. This redistribution of power is one of the dilemmas of the success of the post-World War II system the United States engineered. There is no denying the shift in wealth and power from West to East, of which U.S.-driven globalization was one of the principal motors. But with developing states comprising a half or more of global gdp—and a large and growing portion of their trade and investment with China and each other—can we really expect that they would fall in line with the United States continuing to run the world forever? After all, Chinese, Russian, Indian, Iranian, and other civilizations predate the United States by several millennia. Samuel Huntington may have been wrong on many counts, particularly in asserting the inevitability of the clash of civilizations, but was right in noting that other nations are apt to think they are superior and wouldn’t want to defer to America forever.

Moreover, the United States hasn’t helped itself in the past two decades by mismanaging the global system, championing regime change and democracy promotion programs that have resulted in failure, and seeding more instability than countering it. The ever-lengthening conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan should have been a wake-up call. But no—the United States and its allies destabilized Libya under the rubric of “humanitarian intervention” and then walked away.

THE PROBLEM with failure is that it seeds the ambitions of others. Simultaneous with the foreign policy failures, the United States all-but brought the global system down in the 2008 financial crisis. At that point, China began to be convinced that the United States was in decline. U.S. incompetence in response to the COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced perceptions of decline. While we like to forget, if not forgive ourselves, for our blunders, others are not as charitable. Credibility is a terrible thing to lose.

Domestically, the American public finds the costs of U.S. hegemony too high and the benefits too small. That is one of the lessons of the Trump phenomenon. Written before the eruption of protests inside America, the Blackwill and Wright strategy fails to fathom the magnitude of the problems at home. It understates the depth of U.S. dysfunction this century, its broken political system and the public’s sense of distrust—including of modern medical science—and the difficulty in fixing it. No hegemonic power can effectively run the world while ignoring long-festering domestic schisms and calls for reform. The post-Second World War G.I. bill—which rebuilt the middle class with its low-cost mortgages, low-interest loans to start a business or farm, and tuition payments—was a prerequisite to Truman’s success in convincing the American public to reengage in a global fight against Communism. Finding a scapegoat in China for America’s problems at home and even tariffs against Chinese imports are not a long-term solution for the U.S. middle class.

Only by dealing directly with the problems of the middle class—slipping educational achievement by its sons and daughters and the lack of well-paying jobs—will we have a chance to rebuild our credibility and standing. The challenge is defining a new social contract. Any proposed strategy must suggest a way out of this predicament, not simply say it should happen, as Blackwill and Wright assert. This sort of facile assertion is similarly an attribute of other prescriptive treatises of this genre.

The good news is that we have an opportunity. COVID-19 has almost been as bad as the Great Depression in turning 20 percent or more out of work. Populism, resulting in Trump’s 2016 election, was built on the anger and resentment of former workers in the manufacturing sector seeing their jobs disappear. Even if COVID-19 doesn’t make many salaried workers redundant, automation and AI may soon eliminate or disrupt the job market for much of the workforce. This is a problem facing workers from the factory floor to the professions everywhere. If the United States could be a leader in reforming its social protections, upping educational achievements, and instituting lifelong training opportunities, then maybe it could be a model for helping other countries to adapt to the modern super-charged technological age.

Then there is the issue of diversity. Anti-immigration sentiment and racism are on the upsurge. America used to welcome immigrants, providing the country with a huge demographic and economic advantage. We made great strides in the 1960s on civil rights and allowing non-whites to find a home in America. The United States does have an opportunity to show the world how to tackle this major issue tearing at the social fabric in most advanced economies. It is a mistake to underestimate U.S. resilience. The protracted national protests this summer, sparked by the police killing of George Floyd, and polls indicating substantial shifts in views on racial injustice, may be a glimmer of such resilience ahead. But it’s way overdue to think about the domestic and foreign policies as two sides of the same coin. The more we can turn ourselves back into a model for others, showing how deep-seated problems can be tackled, the better able we will be to re-attract followers.

Unfortunately, COVID-19 has had the opposite effect. The U.S. response, viewed as pitiable incompetence, also looks miserly towards others in the developing world, granting China fertile ground to expand its influence. The Trump administration has made it clear that Americans come first in line for any vaccine—even if the United States must commandeer suppliers from foreign producers. If China leapfrogs ahead in this zero-sum competition for vaccine development, where would that leave the United States?

### Heg Sustainable

#### US heg is sustainable – multiple reasons:

#### Democracies can self-correct and relative economic strength

Roman Darius 20, Writer for The Strategist, “Don’t Panic: America Will Still Dominate the World After Coronavirus”, 6/19/2020, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/dont-panic-america-will-still-dominate-world-after-coronavirus-163154> , accessed 7-23-22, Wpeng

The conspicuous absence of American leadership during the pandemic has emboldened the narratives about the United States’ decline and the weakening of the international order. The result has been a proliferation of commentary on the reconfiguration of global power, and America’s diminished position.

The predictions range from the crisis reshaping the world order and ending the transatlantic relationship, to China becoming the world’s dominant geopolitical player.

Former US diplomat Kurt Campbell, in a Foreign Affairs piece co-authored with Rush Doshi, wrote that for the US, the coronavirus pandemic ‘could mark another Suez moment’. The explicit reference to the crisis of 1956 that signalled the end of Britain’s status as a global power was noted by media in both the US and the UK.

The common denominator of much of the commentary on the US’s decline is the undue weight given to the rhetoric and the policies of President Donald Trump’s administration, at the expense of consideration of the actual indices of global power and influence. Trump’s reluctance to rally the world under the auspices of US leadership may indeed damage the perception of America as the linchpin of the free world, yet there’s been little change to the primary structures of power upon which its global position rests. While America’s pre-eminence will likely withstand the current crisis, the negative repercussions for China may endure.

In the contest for supremacy in what is increasingly being characterised as a new cold war, China now faces a world in which its prospects for expanding its economic influence have been severely circumscribed. As a result of Beijing’s mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak and its penchant for weaponising its economic clout, an almost unanimous consensus has emerged across the developed world on the need to reduce dependency on China.

As former US State Department official Aaron Friedberg observed, ‘[T]he experience of finding themselves dependent in a dire emergency on an irresponsible, opportunistic, and potentially hostile power has clearly left an impression on democratic publics and politicians that will not soon fade.’

The political backlash, coupled with the impetus for domestic industries to diversify in order to manage supply-chain risks, will inhibit the capacity of states to deepen their ties with China. Given the pre-existing economic and technological disparity between the US and China, it’s far from certain how China will narrow the gap in a global climate if all the advanced industrial economies strive to moderate their ties with Beijing.

There’s been a tendency among observers to suggest that, since both Beijing and Washington have mismanaged the crisis, the global power and influence of both will diminish. Such parallels, however, erroneously assume an equivalence in the adaptability of democratic and authoritarian regimes. There’s a resiliency in democracies that’s not shared by autocratic forms of government. As the American public intellectual Walter Lippmann put it, ‘Democracies always have several governments in reserve, whereas autocracies only have one.’ The capacity of democracies to withstand crises is greater than that of autocracies. When a democracy faces a crisis, the entire system of government is not on the line, but rather the transient governing administration. In an autocracy there’s no such clear separation.

The Chinese Communist Party’s lack of transparency, its intransigence on dissent and its propensity to conceal failures and transgressions are the imperatives of a ruling party concerned with regime preservation and maintaining order. The defects of the CCP are enshrined in the state. If the party were to initiate reforms in favour of openness and transparency to re-establish its international credibility, it would risk the survival of CCP rule. And we know that the example of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost in Russia hasn’t been lost on the Chinese leadership.

The Trump administration’s failures and missteps, on the other hand, end with the administration. The US possesses geopolitical, economic, technological and military advantages that are too well entrenched to be jeopardised by any occupant of the White House. Being the only major nation without great-power threats in its own hemisphere gives the US capabilities in force projection that no other power shares.

Economically, America’s per capita GDP is unsurpassed among the great powers, yet it’s also the only power that doesn’t face a demographic problem. The strength of its economy enables the US to outspend all other powers combined on defence, using no more than 4% of its GDP. That’s much less than the 15% to 7% spent from the 1950s to the late 1980s. It’s cheaper for the US to maintain military supremacy today than it was throughout the Cold War.

Despite Trump’s ‘America first’ approach, the global position of the US and its institutions remains intact. Throughout the Covid-19 crisis, it hasn’t been the People’s Bank of China that the central banks of the world have turned to for assistance, but rather the US Federal Reserve, which through swap lines and repo arrangements has again demonstrated how central America is to global stability. Today, the US is still the singular power with the wherewithal and force projection to defend its interests globally. Until that changes, America’s ‘Suez moment’ will still be a long way away.

#### Economic strength and alliance structures

Robert Kagan and Ivo **Daalder** 16, Kagan is a Stephen and Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow, Daalder is a Former Ambassador to NATO specializing in Foreign Policy, “The U.S can’t afford to end its global leadership role”, 4/25/2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/04/25/the-u-s-cant-afford-to-end-its-global-leadership-role/> , accessed 7-23-22, Wpeng

The economic, political and security strategy that the United States has pursued for more than seven decades, under Democratic and Republican administrations alike, is today widely questioned by large segments of the American public and is under attack by leading political candidates in both parties. Many Americans no longer seem to value the liberal international order that the United States created after World War II and sustained throughout the Cold War and beyond. Or perhaps they take it for granted and have lost sight of the essential role the United States plays in supporting the international environment from which they benefit greatly. The unprecedented prosperity made possible by free and open markets and thriving international trade; the spread of democracy; and the avoidance of major conflict among great powers: All these remarkable accomplishments have depended on sustained U.S. engagement around the world. Yet politicians in both parties dangle before the public the vision of an America freed from the burdens of leadership.

What these politicians don’t say, perhaps because they don’t understand it themselves, is that the price of ending our engagement would far outweigh its costs. The international order created by the United States today faces challenges greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. Rising authoritarian powers in Asia and Europe threaten to undermine the security structures that have kept the peace since World War II. Russia invaded Ukraine and has seized some of its territory. In East Asia, an increasingly aggressive China seeks to control the sea lanes through which a large share of global commerce flows. In the Middle East, Iran pursues hegemony by supporting Hezbollah and Hamas and the bloody tyranny in Syria. The Islamic State controls more territory than any terrorist group in history, brutally imposing its extreme vision of Islam and striking at targets throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. None of these threats will simply go away. Nor will the United States be spared if the international order collapses, as it did twice in the 20th century. In the 21st century, oceans provide no security. Nor do walls along borders. Nor would cutting off the United States from the international economy by trashing trade agreements and erecting barriers to commerce.

Instead of following the irresponsible counsel of demagogues, we need to restore a bipartisan foreign policy consensus around renewing U.S. global leadership. Despite predictions of a “post-American world,” U.S. capacities remain considerable. The U.S. economy remains the most dynamic in the world. The widely touted “rise of the rest”—the idea that the United States was being overtaken by the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China—has proved to be a myth. The dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, and people across the globe seek U.S. investment and entrepreneurial skills to help their flagging economies. U.S. institutions of higher learning remain the world’s best and attract students from every corner of the globe. The political values that the United States stands for remain potent forces for change. Even at a time of resurgent autocracy, popular demands for greater freedom can be heard in Russia, China, Iran and elsewhere, and those peoples look to the United States for support, both moral and material. And our strategic position remains strong. The United States has more than 50 allies and partners around the world. Russia and China between them have no more than a handful.

The task ahead is to play on these strengths and provide the kind of leadership that many around the world seek and that the American public can support. For the past two years, under the auspices of the World Economic Forum, we have worked with a diverse, bipartisan group of Americans and representatives from other countries to put together the broad outlines of a strategy for renewed U.S. leadership. There is nothing magical about our proposals. The strategies to sustain the present international order are much the same as the strategies that created it. But they need to be adapted and updated to meet new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities.

For instance, one prime task today is to strengthen the international economy, from which the American people derive so many benefits. This means passing trade agreements that strengthen ties between the United States and the vast economies of East Asia and Europe. Contrary to what demagogues in both parties claim, ordinary Americans stand to gain significantly from the recently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the agreement will increase annual real incomes in the United States by $131 billion. The United States also needs to work to reform existing international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, so that rising economic powers such as China feel a greater stake in them, while also working with new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to ensure that they reinforce rather than undermine liberal economic norms.

The revolution in energy, which has made the United States one of the world’s leading suppliers, offers another powerful advantage. With the right mix of policies, the United States could help allies in Europe and Asia diversify their sources of supply and thus reduce their vulnerability to Russian manipulation. Nations such as Russia and Iran that rely heavily on hydrocarbon exports would be weakened, as would the OPEC oil cartel. The overall result would be a relative increase in our power and ability to sustain the order.

The world has come to recognize that education, creativity and innovation are key to prosperity, and most see the United States as a leader in these areas. Other nations want access to the American market, American finance and American innovation. Businesspeople around the world seek to build up their own Silicon Valleys and other U.S.-style centers of entrepreneurship. The U.S. government can do a better job of working with the private sector in collaborating with developing countries. And Americans need to be more, not less, welcoming to immigrants. Students studying at our world-class universities, entrepreneurs innovating in our high-tech incubators and immigrants searching for new opportunities for their families strengthen the United States and show the world the opportunities offered by democracy.

Finally, the United States needs to do more to reassure allies that it will be there to back them up if they face aggression. Would-be adversaries need to know that they would do better by integrating themselves into the present international order than by trying to undermine it. Accomplishing this, however, requires ending budget sequestration and increasing spending on defense and on all the other tools of international affairs. This investment would be more than paid for by the global security it would provide.

## China Ups

### No Taiwan War

#### No China-Taiwan war –

#### Past US military buildup

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The third is Taiwan’s determination to defend itself. Taiwan at this stage is focusing its efforts on self-reliance without provoking China. The current Tsi Ing-wen government does not chant slogans about independence to ease concerns on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, the Taiwanese government is keen to acquire weapon systems that are essential for defense. Taiwan has continued to increase its defense spending in recent years, especially for defensive systems. The United States is also actively supporting Taiwan in this respect. Thanks to the current military build-up, Taiwan could survive a sudden Chinese attack which makes Beijing hesitant to launch a preemptive but costly military action.

What are the unexpected factors in China’s calculations to use force in the future? Two important factors relate to President Xi. Among the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi might think that unification is something only he can achieve. Neither Mao Zedong, who founded a new country nor Deng Xiaoping, a reform pioneer, could do it. If Xi succeeds in unifying Taiwan with the mainland, he will outrank Mao Zedong. His private ambitions are unlikely to be easily observed publicly, though.

Conversely, if Xi Jinping is weakened, the possibility of an armed attack on Taiwan may increase. In other words, it is a way for Xi to divert the public’s attention to alleviate other internal problems. Therefore, if support for Xi Jinping’s regime weakens, a move to take Taiwan by force could be an option to alleviate the domestic pressure on President Xi.

#### China lacks force capability

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The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) was substantially predicated on preventing two faits accomplis: a Russian invasion of the Baltics and a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. To what degree these scenarios will survive the Biden administration’s soon-to- be-released strategic review remains to be seen. The most likely outcome is that “integrated deterrence,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term—for now more a slogan than a strategic concept that attempts a more “wholistic” all-of-government effort—will become prominent, as will a greater focus on the “deter” element rather than on “defeat” as was the last NDS. Defining what defeat means and how it would be achieved remains elusive. Some observers believe that how the United States handles the Ukraine crisis will be closely watched by China. That is true. But, as this paper argues, the Ukraine crisis will not influence Chinese decisions on whether or not to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion because, given the force demands, China simply lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. The [current](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/23/taiwan-china-threat-admiral-john-aquilino) and [former](https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years) heads of Indo-Pacific Command have warned about China’s building the necessary forces to invade and conquer Taiwan, possibly by decade’s end. Given China’s long-standing determination to make Taiwan part of the mainland and achieve “one China,” a military takeover of Taiwan sounds plausible. However, this notion is based on a fundamental misperception regarding China’s capability to launch a major amphibious assault. If China were to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, what would that take in terms of forces and force levels? Does China possess the requisite numbers and capabilities? If not, when, if at all, might it build those forces that, if history counts, would number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of ships and maritime assault vehicles? Current and past studies do not successfully or specifically address these questions. These studies focus on the how, but not on the specific manpower requirements of what would be required to carry out an invasion. The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, [Operation Causeway](https://grahamthomasauthor.wordpress.com/2020/06/20/operation-causeway/) was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change.

#### Xi’s re-election

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I believe that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be difficult at this time. First, consider the difficulty of starting a war amid political uncertainty. At the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) upcoming National Congress in the fall, President Xi Jinping must be approved for his third term by 2,287 CCP delegates from all over China. Although the vote of approval is merely a symbolic process, Xi would not want his remarkable achievements to be overshadowed by hostile acts before the fall. Therefore, the use of military force against Taiwan would not be an optimal choice.

### Turns Case – Taiwan War impacts causes misapplication of resources

**Misinterpreting China’s intention towards Taiwan causes misapplication of US resources**

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Nevertheless, given China’s size, strength, autocratic government, ambitions, and commitment to “one China,” the United States cannot totally rule out the possibility of an amphibious assault. Focusing US resources primarily on such a scenario would be a grave mistake, however. If the danger of Chinese aggression against, and indeed an invasion of, Taiwan is considered among the likely or plausible scenarios, the response must be to plan to defeat that outcome. Any military conflict with the United States beyond a Taiwan scenario would be a home game for China and an away game for the United States and those who might be persuaded to join the fight. Substantial resources would be needed to compensate for the disadvantages of geography and external lines of communications. Taiwan is only 100 miles off the Chinese coast. With China’s DF-21 and other missiles with ranges of 1,500-2,000 miles, a reinforcing naval force would come under fire for at least two or more day’s steaming before reaching the combat area. They would also have to avoid submarine and other maritime threats. The same problem applies to aviation units that would enter China’s air defense zones. To complicate this matter of reinforcement and coming to Taiwan’s defense, some polls show that Americans are more worried about a Chinese invasion than are the Taiwanese. Defending a friend is more difficult when that friend is less preoccupied or concerned with the threat than US citizens are. The United States cannot be successful in defending Taiwan if it regards the Chinese threat as more dangerous than the country it intends to protect. Finally, **fixating on an unlikely scenario**, no matter how compelling it sounds, **skews US resources and force levels**. An expeditionary force designed to protect Taiwan may not fit more relevant roles such as supporting formal treaty allies, responding to other contingencies, and influencing China by force dispositions—especially if there is no appetite to invade in the first place. It was no accident that Napoleon and Hitler failed to cross the 25-mile wide English Channel! The United States must consider and plan for many contingencies with respect to Taiwan**. China has options other than a full-scale amphibious invasion.** It could seize small islands belonging to Taiwan, such as Kinmen and Matsu, to exert leverage. It could impose economic and financial embargoes. It could impose a physical blockade with its maritime militia physically denying access to the island. It could attempt a regime change from within, using the equivalent of Russia’s “Little Green Men” who seized the Crimean Parliament in 2014. China could infiltrate the political parties and Taiwanese government and use influence operations to change public support. It could contrive or provoke a crisis to force Taiwan to accept a settlement that could lead to annexation. It could obliterate Taiwan under a rain of missiles. However, unless Taiwan were to declare independence**, it is very unlikely that**—barring a crisis—**China would attempt any direct annexation**. Moreover, an amphibious assault is not now a serious or feasible option. Misunderstanding an adversary in developing a strategy leads to failure, or worse. Hitler thought Russia would fold in 1941. The Japanese thought Pearl Harbor would force an American capitulation. Gen. Douglas MacArthur did not believe the Chinese would intervene in Korea as his forces raced toward the Yalu River in late 1950. Washington believed it could bomb North Vietnam into submission, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraqis could easily takeover governing their country after Saddam Hussein had been overthrown. The Pentagon’s civilian leaders have declared China to be “the pacing challenge for the US military.” Many Americans are fearful that a rising China’s increasing diplomatic assertiveness, military buildup, militarizing small islets in the China Seas, and pursuit of the ambitious Belt-and-Road Initiative is a danger not only to the United States, but to much of the world. However, the nature of the specific threats is not clear. A possible Taiwan invasion must be plausible and based on why and how China could or would embark on that course of action. Thus far, no US administration has explained how such an invasion would be carried out.

### Economic Decline Impact – Taiwan-China War

**Domestic economic downturn triggers Taiwan – China war – extremist politics**

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Taiwan’s domestic issues must also be considered. Taiwan is a young democratic country that is vulnerable to demagoguery by politicians trying to win elections. Generally speaking, in a democratic country, extremist lines can easily win support from the public during economic downturns. Much as Adolf Hitler came to power when the German people were struggling with unbearable reparations after World War I, it is possible that a Taiwanese political leader could promote independence as a solution to Taiwan’s worsening economic situation. In this situation, China will have no choice but to respond militarily. As with any society, Taiwan faces many internal problems. First, low wages and high housing costs are affecting the marriage rate and leading to decreases in fertility. It is true that Taiwan’s economy is currently healthy despite the stress of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, if the economic situation worsens and unemployment and inflation rise, the domestic problems mentioned above may be the straw that broke the camel’s back. In November, Taiwan will have local council elections and two years later, there will be a presidential election. What if politicians running for election take an extreme position on independence to boost their popularity? It is likely that the Taiwanese will respond to the political slogan of politicians, and desire independence from China as a blueprint for a hopeful future.